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1. Introduction. The U.S. government released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report in 
2010.
61
  The NPR Report is declaratory policy that warns adversaries and assures allies about 
how the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to defend the people, territories, and vital interests of 
the United States.  The NPR Report reflects the current administration‘s beliefs that nuclear 
weapons are not highly relevant to defending against biological weapons (BW) threats, but that 
unpredictable scientific developments could necessitate a return to greater reliance on nuclear 
weapons for protection.   
2. Assessing Biological Weapons Threats.  Current BW threat assessment is complicated by the 
fact that states and non-state actors can develop biological weapons without leaving a distinct 
and detectable signature.  Consequently, experts such as Gregory Koblentz have observed that 
―little is known…about the level of effort currently devoted to using biotechnology for 
malevolent purposes by state and nonstate actors.‖62  Up until the 1990s the threat of biological 
weapons was associated almost exclusively with state sponsored biological warfare programs.  
Over the last two decades, however, biological terrorism by non-state actors also has emerged as 
a credible threat. 
 A. Non-state Actors and Bioterrorism.  The phrase, ―The Biological Century,‖ has gained 
currency as the belief that the biological sciences will continue to experience spectacular and 




  This is mostly good news, but the awareness 
of advances in biology also has fostered great concern about a purported explosion of biological 
know-how among the population at large and—by implication—among terrorists.  In 2010, the 
Wall Street Journal noted that, ―today, do-it-yourself biology clubs have sprung up where part-
timers share tips on how to build high-speed centrifuges, isolate genetic material, and the 
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like.‖64,65  It has been asserted that the scientific revolution in the life sciences amounts to a 
dangerous ―proliferation of know-how—if not the actual pathogens.‖66 
 Richard Danzig warned in 2005 that ―only a thin veil of terrorist ignorance and inexperience 
now protects us‖ against biological attacks.67  He cautions, however, that in the near term, ―most 
terrorist groups will not incline towards biological weapons,‖ as the technical demands of 
employing BW and the heightened risk of detection by law enforcement will outweigh any 
potential benefits of bioterrorism compared to kidnapping and suicide bombing.
68
  Although 
Danzig concedes that ―no sound calculation can be made as to whether an individual or group 
will effectively produce and employ biological weapons within the next decade, year or 
month,‖69 he is adamant that this unpredictability should not provide solace.  Terrorist 
organizations have demonstrated their ability to work within an extended time horizon to obtain 
political objectives and master new techniques.  Early successes with innovative terrorism 
tactics, even if limited, typically spawn imitators and enhancements.
70
   
 U.S. officials also have expressed a high level of concern about non-state bioterrorism.  For 
instance, Undersecretary of State, Ellen Tauscher, remarked in 2009 that, ―while the United 
States remains concerned about state-sponsored biological warfare and proliferation, we are 
equally, if not more concerned, about an act of bioterrorism...‖71 
 Milton Leitenberg has argued the opposing view, namely that the risk of large-scale 
bioterrorism is vastly overblown.
72,73
  Known terrorists groups, he claims, have ―little or no 
scientific competence, little or no knowledge of microbiology, and no known access to pathogen 
strains or laboratory facilities.‖74  He noted that various high-level national threat assessments 
have downplayed terrorist BW capabilities
75,76
 and he further asserted that there is ―no evidence‖ 
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of states providing biological agents, technology or know-how to terrorist organizations.
77
 
Leitenberg buttressed his arguments by arguing that the 2001 ―Amerithrax‖ attacks, which the 
FBI attributes solely to U.S. government scientist Bruce Ivins,
78
 demonstrated that it takes a 
professional microbiologist working in a state-of-the-art laboratory to succeed at bioterrorism.
79
  
Koblentz falls somewhere between Danzig and Leitenberg.  Observing that only Ivins and the 
Rajneeshees ever caused bioterrorism casualties (and on a very small scale at that), he asserts 
that ―analyses of the security implications of dual-use research frequently suffer from…flaws 
that serve to exaggerate the severity of the threat.‖80 Thus the challenge for the U.S. national 
security community is to determine which of these three assessments is closest to the truth. 
 B. State-sponsored BW programs.  In the heyday of their offensive BW programs, both 
the U.S. and USSR sought weapons with ―nuclear scale‖ lethality,81 and even since the end of 
the Cold War, some analysts have warned that a state sponsored BW attack could cause truly 
massive death, injuries and illness.  In the early post Cold War period, a U.S. government 
analysis estimated that under certain conditions, an attack with aerosolized anthrax—a primary 
focus of the Soviet biological warfare program—could cause up to three million deaths.82  More 
recently, John Steinbruner contemplated the deliberate creation of a pathogen that combines the 
virulence/lethality of smallpox with the contagiousness of the 1918 influenza.
83
  That possibility, 
he concluded, means that ―one can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than 
with the current nuclear weapons arsenal.‖84 Since the U.S. abjured offensive BW in 1969, 
nuclear weapons have been the only weapons in the U.S. arsenal capable of delivering retaliation 
on a scale commensurate with a worst case BW attack.
85
 Thus analysts continue to argue that 
America may need nuclear weapons to deter biological attacks.
86
   
 The State Department has issued three reports over the last decade documenting the official 
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U.S. view of whether other states have offensive BW programs that are prohibited under the 
BWC.
87
  Whereas the 2001 and 2005 reports firmly accused Russia, China and Iran of having 
prohibited programs, the 2010 report simply says that these states show evidence of engaging in 
prohibited activities, and that they are not as forthcoming as they need to be to remove doubt.  In 
2010, only North Korea and Syria received unambiguous reprimands for engaging in offensive 
weapons programs (down from seven nations in 2001 and five in 2005).  Leitenberg also 
questioned whether the earlier estimates may have been too high, possibly due to having relied 
upon inadequate intelligence.‖88  
3. Purported Roles of Nuclear Weapons in Defending Against BW Threats.  The National 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
89
 outlines the U.S. government‘s multifaceted 
response to the threat of bioterrorism.  It states that ―where we identify States, groups or 
individuals seeking to acquire or use biological weapons, we will use all appropriate means to 
disrupt or deny their efforts, drawing on a wide range of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, 
intelligence, law enforcement and other tools.‖90  Interpreting ―other tools‖ to mean nuclear 
weapons would be a reach.  Likewise, the NPR Report does not suggest that nuclear weapons 
play a role in protecting the United States against nuclear or any other kind of WMD terrorism.  
Historically, though, the government has taken the position that nuclear weapons can protect the 
U.S. against state-sponsored BW programs in two ways.  First, threats of nuclear retaliation may 
deter BW attacks.  Second, the U.S. military could use nuclear weapons to destroy enemy 
stockpiles of biological agents in war or in a preventive first strike. 
 A. Deterrence of State BW Attacks.
91
  President Roosevelt stated in 1943 that the U.S. 
would not be the first to use BW, but would retain a retaliatory capability for purposes of 
deterrence.
92
  This remained U.S. declaratory policy regarding BW until President Nixon ended 
the nation‘s offensive BW program in 1969.  Before Nixon‘s action, there was substantial 
disagreement within the national security establishment concerning BW‘s utility for various 
military purposes, their ability to deter biological or nuclear attacks, or even nuclear weapons‘ 
ability to deter biological attacks.  Such questions were hotly debated internally as Nixon 
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considered jettisoning biological warfare; even then National Security Advisor Kissinger found it 
necessary to assure the president that nuclear weapons would serve as a sufficient deterrent 
against biological attacks by states.
93
  It is likely, however, that Nixon already had reached that 
conclusion.  In a famous 1970 remark to William Safire, Nixon said: ''We'll never use the damn 
germs, so what good is biological warfare as a deterrent? If somebody uses germs on us, we'll 
nuke 'em.''
94
  He and Kissinger no doubt assumed that any would-be adversary of the United 
States would discern that unspoken threat. 
   Deterrence theory is hardly absolute when it comes to the relationships among states with 
nuclear weapons and those without.  According to a recent study, ―the deterrence relationships 
involving nuclear states and non-nuclear states in possession of other WMD capabilities are 
fraught with uncertainties.‖95 Koblentz and Susan Martin, two scholars who have devoted 
substantial attention to the national security and military functions of BW, say little about 
nuclear deterrence of BW attacks in their seminal articles on the issue.
96
  Martin, however, 
strongly implies that BW are potent enough to deter even nuclear threats.
97
     
 Drawing upon history rather than theory, Scott Sagan asserts that there is ―little firm 
historical evidence on which to judge whether and how nuclear threats can deter chemical or 
biological attacks…‖ and he argues that it is dangerous for a leader to make nuclear threats for 
that purpose.
98
   Doing so, he believes, puts the leader‘s and nation‘s reputation on the line; if 
deterrence fails, the leader will feel more compelled to actually retaliate with nuclear weapons 
than if he had not made such a threat.
99
  Martin isn‘t bothered by that.  Given the immense 
potential lethality of BW, she says, the extra deterrence that a perceived nuclear threat provides 
is ―well worth‖ running a higher risk of retaliating with nuclear weapons if deterrence fails.100 
 B. Destroying stockpiles of biological agents.  Following the demise of the Soviet Union, 
concerns about WMDs from ―rogue nations‖ quickly came to the fore.  Just as quickly, U.S. 
nuclear planners became more flexible and revised their targeting methodology to include BW 
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  The Pentagon began research on precision-guided nuclear weapons that would hit 
targets with amazing accuracy, have lower yields and kill fewer civilians, and be able to destroy 
buried or even mobile targets. DoD was particularly interested in weapons that could destroy 
buried caches of biological agents and deeply-buried command and control bunkers where 
megalomaniacal leaders who had attacked the U.S. with WMD might otherwise hide out and 
survive.
102
   
 In 1997 Keith Payne, soon to become one of the architects of the Bush Administration‘s 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review,
103
 argued that absent impeccable intelligence about an adversary 
possessing BW, it is virtually impossible to have confidence that threats to retaliate with either 
conventional or nuclear weapons will dissuade that adversary from attacking.  In a hint of 
administration posture to follow, Payne urged that ―U.S. policy should hedge against the 
possibility of its own failure,‖ and be prepared both to issue and to execute threats to destroy an 
opponent‘s BW, rather than limit itself to retaliation.104 
 The Pentagon, however, believed that conventional weapons had severe limitations for 
destroying stockpiles of biological agents.  They released ―insufficient energy to heat to lethal 
temperatures the large masses of agent stored in moderate-sized or large facilities, [and as a 
result] significant quantities of live agent could survive and be dispersed over very large areas, 
potentially causing the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of civilians...‖105   
 The George W. Bush Administration raised the priority for so-called ―bunker buster‖ 
nuclear weapons that could fully neutralize biological agents and avoid the risk of infecting 
nearby civilians, and thus provide a hedge against deterrence failure.  It sought long-term 
funding for a weapon called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).
106
  A number of 
analyses, however, questioned whether either existing nuclear stockpile weapons or the RNEP 
could sterilize deeply buried biological agents.
107
 They also questioned if it was possible to 
estimate or ethically balance the tradeoffs (i.e., the increased deaths from nuclear collateral 
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damage versus the lives spared by reduced dispersal of biological agents) that would arise from 
destroying biological agents with nuclear instead of conventional weapons.
108
  After Congress 
ended funding for RNEP in 2005,
109
 DoD accelerated development of several conventional 
bombs that can penetrate deeply underground before detonating massive non-nuclear 
payloads.
110
 These new conventional capacities will bring into question any future U.S. threats to 
use nuclear weapons to destroy buried BW or agents.
111
 
4. The 2010 NPR and Declaratory Nuclear Policy.  The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report 
constitutes the United States‘ current ―declaratory nuclear policy.‖  A 1995 RAND monograph 
states that ―the principal function of declaratory policy is to suggest the circumstances under 
which the United States will consider specific retaliatory options…It signals U.S. perceptions of 
the gravity of specific acts by announcing those retaliatory options the United States might 
exercise…‖112  A decades-long debate over how specific, transparent, or ambiguous declaratory 
nuclear policy should be in order to best protect American security carried over into the 2010 
NPR process and the NPR Report.  This discussion elicited strongly conflicting positions around 
the issues of ―Negative Security Assurances,‖ ―No First Use‖ pledges and the role of nuclear 
weapons in general. 
 A. Negative Security Assurances.  A ―Negative security assurance‖ (NSA) is a statement 
describing those circumstances under which a nation engaged in a military conflict with the 
United States can assume that the United States will not attack it (or retaliate against it) with 
nuclear weapons.  Prior to the 2010 NPR, U.S. presidents had issued NSA‘s three times.  The 
original 1978 Carter version said: ―The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any 
non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding 
commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the 
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-
weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the 
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attack.‖113  President Clinton‘s 1995 reaffirmation of the NSA put states to which the U.S. had 
extended a security commitment on a par with allies and clarified that a non-nuclear weapon 
state must be in compliance with the NPT in order to count on the NSA, but otherwise left the 
wording alone.
114
  The Bush Administration extended Clinton‘s NSA essentially verbatim.115 
 The 2010 NSA states simply that ―the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with 
their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.‖116  However, the NPR Report also contains what 
former Secretary of State James Baker has called ―wiggle room‖—language that gives the 
administration an ―out‖ if the dreaded Frankenstein pathogen or mega-anthrax attack becomes 
more plausible.
117
 The Report asserts that ―given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons 
and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make 
any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the 
biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.‖118 
 B.  A Declining Reliance upon Nuclear Weapons to Protect Against BW Threats.  The 
NPR Report also affirms that since the end of the Cold War, "the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
deterring non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has declined 
significantly,‖ and it sets two long-term goals.  First, ―the United States will continue to reduce 
the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.‖119  Second, ―the United States will 
consult with allies and partners regarding the conditions under which it would be prudent to shift 
to a policy under which deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons 
(emphasis added).‖120 In other words, in spite of the seemingly straightforward NSA, the U.S. is 
not yet willing to totally decouple nuclear and biological weapons. 
 C.  No “No First Use” Pledge.  The 2010 NPR is silent on another relevant aspect of 
nuclear declaratory policy known as ―no first use‖ (NFU).  A state adopting a NFU position 
asserts that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against another, and would launch 
nuclear armed missiles or bombers only after having absorbed a nuclear first strike.  Such a 
policy--if observed--would preclude a country from using nuclear weapons either preventively, 
to destroy another state‘s BW stockpiles or emerging BW capability, or to retaliate against an 
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actual BW attack.  An explicit NFU pledge would be inconsistent with any attempt to use 
nuclear threats to deter biological weapon attacks through either dissuasion or denial.  The 
administration would not go that far.
121
  
 D.  Calculated Ambiguity.  Biological threats, weapons, warfare or attacks are barely 
mentioned within the 442 pages of publicly available Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
testimony on the New START Treaty.
122
 However, several former senior defense and diplomatic 
officials and senators express nostalgia for the ―calculated ambiguity‖ which they believe has 
been compromised by the new, seemingly less conditional NSA.
123
  ―Calculated ambiguity‖ 
means being deliberately coy with adversaries as to whether or not you will retaliate against a 
WMD attack with nuclear weapons.  Proponents of calculated ambiguity rely primarily upon a 
particular reading of Saddam Hussein‘s behavior in 1991; they believe that ambiguous but 
unmistakable threats of nuclear retaliation communicated by President Bush and Secretary 
Baker, dissuaded Saddam from attacking U.S. forces or Israel with chemical or BW.
124
  Sagan 
has argued against this interpretation for over a decade.
125,126
  
 E.  Declaratory Policy vs. Actual Policy.  Contradictions between a state‘s declaratory 
policy and its leaders‘ actual behavior are nothing new.  In fact, one analyst who carefully 
compared U.S. declaratory nuclear policy with actual nuclear developments over the last two 
decades concluded that there has been ―a fundamental disharmony between declared policy and 
U.S. nuclear warriors‘ activities…‖127  In 1995 President Clinton reaffirmed Carter‘s 1978 NSA, 
even though Clinton‘s own 1994 nuclear posture review had proposed using nuclear weapons to 
deter biological weapon attacks.  Throughout the 1990s, the Pentagon invested heavily in nuclear 
technology for that purpose and added BW to nuclear target lists.
128
  U.S. officials repeatedly 
offered ambiguous statements suggesting the possibility of nuclear retaliation for biological 
attacks, notwithstanding the NSAs then in effect.
129
  In fact, the Bush State Department official 
who affirmed the Clinton NSA in 2002 effectively negated it in the next breath.  Immediately 
after reiterating that the United States ―will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 
states parties to the [NPT],‖ he added, ―If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the 
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United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response.‖130  One 
must assume that U.S. leaders‘ willingness to contradict national declaratory policy influences 
the calculations of potential adversaries.
131
  
5. Conclusion.  The 2010 NPR briefly focused attention on the historically limited relationships 
between BW and nuclear weapons, and shows that those relationships remain of marginal 
importance within nuclear weapons policy.  The NPR Report reflects a retreat from the Bush 
Administration‘s view that an effective way to discourage malevolent actors from developing 
BW is to have nuclear weapons capable of destroying such weapons with minimum collateral 
damage, no matter where such BW may be hidden or buried.  The new, streamlined NSA 
appears to undermine ―calculated ambiguity,‖ but that may merely be a side effect of its main 
purpose, which is to encourage states to comply with the NPT.  Finally, the NPR Report 
articulates the aspiration to totally decouple nuclear weapons and biological threats as one step 
on the road to a nuclear-free world.  However, the NSA‘s ―wiggle room‖ shows that nuclear 
declaratory policy remains constrained by beliefs that scientific advances may yet enable 
enemies to create utterly devastating BW, and that only the threat of nuclear retaliation will deter 
parties from pursuing that path.  Nothing on the horizon suggests that this fear will diminish.  
Overall, the 2010 NPR produced modest changes in long-standing declaratory policy regarding 
BW.  In the words of State Department official Robert J. Einhorn, one of the officials dispatched 
to spin the NPR Report upon its release, ―this is an evolutionary approach rather than a 
revolutionary approach.‖132 
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